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EFFECTS OF UNION ORGANIZATION
ON STRIKE INCIDENCE IN EU COMPANIES
GIEDO JANSEN*
The author reinvestigates the relationship between the organiza-
tional power of trade unions and strikes based on data from the
European Company Survey 2009 (ECS-2009) and the histitutional
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention
and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) database, which include more than
5,000 firms across all 27 European Union (EU) member states. He
shows that the incidence of strikes is higher in companies for which
workplace union membership is high, the number of workplace
unions is high, and unions dominate establishment-level works
councils. These factors interact to affect strike incidence. In addi-
tion, the company-level effects of union organization on strike inci-
dence vary across countries. These country differences can partially
be explained by differences in national trade union systems, such as
decentralization and membership density.
The presence of trade unions is generally considered a prerequisite forlabor strikes; without organization, people lack the ability for collective
action to address their grievances (Snyder 1975; Franzosi 1989). The asso-
ciation between union organization and strike incidence is well documented
in the hterature (e.g., Ross and Irwin 1951; Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder
1975; Fdwards 1978; Kaufman 1982; Wheeler 1984; Shalev 1992; Tsebelis
and Lange 1995; Piazza 2005). Most empirical studies on this matter are
based on observations at a national level. Over the last few decades, how-
ever, collective bargaining has decentralized in many countries. Since the
1980s, collective bargaining in Western Europe has shifted away from na-
tional industry-wide bargaining toward the level of individual firms (Katz
1993; Supiot 2001; Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittel 2001). Today, company-level
bargaining is often a part of the collective bargaining process. When bar-
gaining predominately occurs at higher levels, firm-level negotiations fre-
quently follow broader sectoral or national negotiations. Fven more than in
Western European nations, most (wage) bargaining in the new EU member
states currently occurs at the local, company level (Welz and Kauppinen
2004; also see the data by Visser 2011 ).
*Giedo Jansen is a Po.stdoctoral Researcher at the Institute for Management Research, Nijmegen
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To date, however, company-level evidence regarding union organization
and strike activity is limited. Because earlier studies at the company level
(e.g., Blanchflower and Cubbin 1986; Cramm 1986; Drago and Wooden
1990; Machin, Stewart, and Van Reenen 1993; Dobson 1997) or negotiation
level (e.g., Ingram, Metcalf, and Wadsworth 1993; Campolieti, Hebdon, and
Hyatt 2005) have covered only one or a few companies or countries, the
generalizability of these results is low. Moreover, because only a few studies
have used cross-national data sets to examine the link between union orga-
nization and strike incidence, the findings concerning country-to-country
differences in this relationship are inconclusive (e.g., the two-country com-
parisons of Coutrot [1998] as well as Whitfield, Marginson, and Brown
[1994] ). An additional shortcoming of these studies is that they were unable
to measure and formally test the intervening effect of the national context;
rather, they inferred that context matters based on the finding that the ef-
fects that local unions have on strikes sometimes differs by country. For ex-
ample, Coutrot (1998) found that the ability of trade unions to initiate a
strike is more dependent on membership levels in Britain than in France.
He interpreted this finding as an effect of differences in legal constraints on
the unions' abilities to organize collective action. Coutrot (1998: 190) ar-
gued that British unions "have been obliged to hold a ballot before launch-
ing a lawful strike, while their French counterparts have no such obligation."
Although this interpretation suggests that the magnitude of the relation-
ship between unions and strikes depends on national conditions, more
stringent analyses are required to formally test whether the national labor
context influences firm-level industrial relationships.
In this article I employ data from the European Company Survey, 2009
(ECS-2009) initiated by Eurofound. The data from this large-scale cross-
national workplace survey in the European Union (EU) allow researchers
to examine trade unions and strikes in more than 5,000 firms across all 27
EU member states. Using this data, I investigate the relationship between
the organizational power of trade unions and industrial conflict in the EU
while making three contributions to the literature. First, hypotheses are
tested regarding union organization and strikes at the level of individual
companies. A focus on local union organization has become increasingly
relevant as a result of the move toward decentralized collective bargaining
(Hancké 1993; Benson and Gospel 2008). Second, the strong comparative
character of this study exceeds the scope of previous workplace studies. To
my knowledge, no other study examines strikes within individual companies
and compares more than two countries. Third, I conduct analyses that are
not only cross-national but also multi- and cross-level in nature. Progress is
made by supplementing the ECS-2009 data with country-level data from the
database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting,
State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) (Visser 2011) and by using
multilevel models to examine how national union characteristics influence
the association between union organization and strikes in EU companies.
Specifically, with this study I aim to answer two questions: 1 ) To what extent
62 ILRREVIEW
is Strike incidence associated with union organization at the company level
in EU countries? 2) To what extent do national trade union systems condi-
tion the company-level associations between strike incidence and union or-
ganization?
The Need for a Company-Level Analysis
in a Cross-National Perspective
Differences in strike incidence are, from the perspective of resource mobili-
zation (see Franzosi 1995), related to variations in union organization be-
cause unions facilitate the capacity and means for collective action. I assess
the effects of three indicators of local trade union organization on strike
incidence: union membership rate, multi-unionism, and union-dominated works
councils. These indicators are related to strikes given that they either in-
crease or decrease a union's organizational capacity in times of mobilization
for collective action.
Union Organization and Strikes at the Workplace
Union membership rate is sometimes considered a key indicator for the "capac-
ity to strike" (Shorter and Tilly 1974; Snyder 1975; Kaufman 1982). Scholars
assume that the decision to strike is predominantly made by unions and that
in principle only union members will strike (Snyder 1975). Therefore, the
capacity to strike should increase as union membership among workers in-
creases. The vast majority of previous studies examining the association be-
tween union membership and strikes have relied on observations at the
country or state level. Workplace surveys can assess the extent to which this
relationship is also observable at the level of individual firms. An examina-
tion of the international comparative literature, however, reveals that only a
few workplace surveys are available, and these studies only modestly test the
aforementioned relationship. For example, based on company-level data
from British firms in the 1980s, Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986) found that
higher rates of unionized manual workers are associated with a greater pro-
pensity for industrial action, including strikes. Coutrot (1998) compared
British and French firms in the 1990s and concluded that, although the ef-
fect of union density is positive and significant in both countries, it was
stronger in Britain than in France. "French unions are able to launch strikes
even when they organize a small portion of the workforce, while British
unions' ability to do so is more dependent on their levels of membership"
(Coutrot 1998: 198). In the present study, I provide a more rigorous test of
the relationship between membership rate and strikes by investigating this
effect in companies across all EU countries.
Second, the number of trade unions represented at the workplace indi-
cates a division within the labor movement (i.e., "multi-unionism"; Clegg
1976; Korpi and Shalev 1979; Dobson 1997; Akkerman 2008; Hartcourt and
Lam 2011). When more than one trade union is available to represent
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workers, union competition may occur, which increases the potential for
strikes.' The empirical status of multi-unionism, however, is not clear. Early
national-level studies demonstrated that union competitioti is not associ-
ated with higher levels of strikes in all countries. For example, Ross and
Hartman (1960) noted that the Netherlands is a significant exception; al-
though pervasive divisions exist within the labor movement, strikes do not
occur frequently. Focusing on the sector level, Akkerman (2000) demon-
strated that the relationship between multi-unionism and strikes differed
across countries. The few available studies at the company level demonstrate
a positive effect of multi-union representation on the number of strikes. An
analysis of workplace surveys in Britain (Ingram et al. 1993; Machin et al.
1993; Dobson 1997) revealed that the presence of more than one union was
associated with higher strike incidence than single unionism. Drago and
Wooden (1990) reached a similar conclusion in an analysis of data from a
1988 survey of Australian workplaces. A drawback, however, of these studies
is that they were restricted to Australia and the United Kingdom. To deter-
mine whether the conclusions from these studies hold in other settings, in
this study I investigate the effect of multi-unionism in cross-national per-
spective.
Third, I will examine the effect of union-dominated works councils. The
strength of a trade union may depend on specific organizational resources
in individual firms. For example, Blanchflower and Cubbin (1986) showed
that the presence of a shop steward was associated with a greater propensity
for industrial action in the 1980s within British firms. Kelly (1996: 81) ar-
gued that unions can extend their influence at the workplace by engaging
employers using non-bargaining channels, taking part in discussions on is-
sues that are of common interest, such as training, health and safety, and
productivity. In many FU countries, these issues are organized within local
bodies for communication between management and the workforce (i.e., in
works councils). Works council membership is rarely confined to trade
unionists, although in so-called single-channel systems, unions possess a mo-
nopoly right of representation (see Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman
2010). In practice, and especially in dual-channel systems in which unions
and works councils formally have distinct bases of representation, the de-
marcation between union and nonunion representation is often unclear.
Unions occasionally dominate works councils (Carley, Baradel, and Welz
2005). For example, the majority of councilors in large firms in Germany
are union members (Kelly 1996; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2010).
Visser (1995) argued that union-dominated councils help to sustain the or-
ganizing efforts of the union. Certain trade unions may be weak at the local
workplace in terms of membership but may hold a strong position on works
'With respect to multi-union representation, the industrial relations systems in Europe differ substan-
tially from those in North America (Akkerman 2008). Whereas multi-unionism disappeared alter the
1935 Wagner Act in the United States, more than one union is often recognized for collective bargaining
in Europe, both at the firm and sector levels.
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councils. Therefore, works councils may increase the capacity to strike when
union-dominated.
In sum, this study reinvigorates the research on the relationship between
the organizational strength of trade unions and industrial conflict using a
large-scale analysis at the company level. To test whether, and to what extent,
the relationship between union organization and strike incidence can be iden-
tified as a company-level phenomenon, I formulate the following hypotheses.
Hypotheses la-lc: Strikes are more likely in companies as
(la) union membership is higher,
(lb) the number of unions is higher, and
(lc) works councils are union-dominated.
The Interplay between Organizational Resources
After formulating general hypotheses regarding the direct effects of union
organization on strike incidence, I will specify the conditions under which
these effects might be stronger or weaker. I focus on the interaction among
the three types of union organization. Eirst, I discuss the potential interplay
between membership rates and multi-unionism. Eollowing Hypothesis la, I
expect that membership rates in companies are positively correlated with
strike incidence given that a certain level of organization among employees
is required for collective action (Eranzosi 1989). Multi-unionism indicates
trade union division and fragmentation (Ross and Hartman 1960; Clegg
1976; Korpi and Shalev 1979; Akkerman 2008). If Oswald's claim (1979) is
correct and division within the labor movement leads to a lack of coopera-
tion between rival unions, then multi-unionism will undermine the union's
organizational capacity for mobilization. Different unions might not only
represent different groups of employees but also articulate different inter-
ests and grievances. When two or more unions are represented at the work-
place, I expect that the overall union membership rate in a firm will be less
strongly correlated with strikes. Specifically,
Hypothesis 2a: The positive effect of union membership on strike
incidence weakens as the number of unions increases.
A further potential interaction is between membership rate and the pres-
ence of a union-dominated works council. The hypothesis that strikes are
more likely in companies with union-dominated works councils is based on
the assumption that, under these circumstances, the union possesses addi-
tional organizational resources. Unions can, and may choose to, strengthen
and extend their organizational capacity at the workplace by using works
councils as alternative channels to communicate with employers and em-
ployees. Therefore, domination over works councils might make a union
less dependent on general membership rates to mobilize employees and to
organize a strike. Hence,
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Hypothesis 2b: The positive effect of union membership on strike
incidence is weaker in companies where works councils are union-
dominated.
Next, there may be interaction between the effects of multi-unionism and
union-dominated works councils. If competition undermines interunion co-
operation, then multi-unionism could fragment the unions' position in the
works council. Under multi-unionism, employee representatives may be
members in different unions with distinct membership compositions and
interests. Therefore, I expect that when two or more unions are represented
at the workplace, the overall numerical domination of trade unionists in a
company's works council will be less strongly correlated with the occurrence
of a strike. Thus,
Hypothesis 2c: The positive effect of union-dominated works coun-
cils on strike incidence weakens as the number of unions increases.
Trade Union Systems: Company-Level Effects in Context
As previously mentioned, only a few studies have investigated whether the
national context influences labor relationships and collective action at the
firm level using cross-national data sets (Wliitfield et al. 1994; Coutrot 1998).
The availability of the ECS-2009 data enables me to examine not only
whether, and to what extent, differences occur between EU countries regard-
ing the effect of union organization on strike incidence but also luhy these
differences occur. Therefore, this study formally tests whether the relevance
of local union organization differs across countries. The null hypotheses
that no country differences exist should be rejected if trade union effects on
strikes are country-dependent. Thus,
Hypothesis 3a-3c: The company-level effects on strike incidence
regarding
(3a) union membership rates,
(3b) the number of unions, and
(3c) union-dominated work councils
will be different across EU countries.
To study why there might be cross-national differences in the association
between union organization and strike incidence within companies, I will
explore the interplay between company-level and country-level organiza-
tional resources. The primary argument to do so is that trade unions might
rely on a combination of central and decentralized organizations, and na-
tional unions might function as a pool of support and resources for local
unions (Hancké 1993), constrain local union autonomy (Benson and Gos-
pel 2008), or both. In this respect, resources and constraints for mobiliza-
tion may relate to location of the decisions concerning union activities, to
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where the funds are held and spent, and to sources of recognition and le-
gitimacy (Benson and Gospel 2008). The capacity of local unions to engage
in industrial conflict should therefore be studied with regard to national
union structures. I foctis on three features of the trade union system that
might strengthen or weaken the union-organization effects at the firm level
(i.e., a country's degree oJunion density, its number oJtrade union confederations,
and its level oJdecentralization in the trade union movement).
Union density is often a macro-level indicator of the power of a labor
movement and its organizational capacity. The use of this indicator relates
to the micro-level expectation that higher membership rates in companies
are positively correlated with the occurrence of strikes. Eurthermore, the
resources for organizing and initiating a strike in companies might also be
greater when national levels of union density are higher. For example, the
number of fee-paying members will partially determine the amount of fi-
nancial resources that a union has at its disposal. National unions might fi-
nance local branches or allocate money to strike funds. To enable a strike,
workplace branches might benefit from the resources of national unions or
confederations. Consequently, local branches will be less dependent on
company-level resources when national membership rates are high.
Hypothesis 4: The company-level effects of union organization on
strike incidence are weaker in countries where union density is
higher.
Similarly, I expect a moderating effect of the fragmentation of a country's
labor movement. As I argued earlier, multi-unionism will undermine the
organizational resources that are associated with high membership rates. In
addition to multi-unionism at individual companies, however, the fragmen-
tation of the national labor movement may have a similar effect. In a coun-
try in which the labor movement is divided into a wide array of trade unions
and union confederations, the variovis unions may articulate different inter-
ests and grievances, diminishing the capacity to mobilize members at the
workplace. This observation leads to my second cross-level interaction hy-
pothesis.
Hypothesis 5: The company-level effects of union organization on
strike incidence are weaker in countries where the number of
confederations is higher.
Finally, I investigate the degree of decentralization in the national labor
movement. I expect that the capacity for the collective action of local unions
depends on their own autonomy and, in turn, the control of national con-
federations. Greater independence of local branches and representatives
might advance the capacity of workplace unions to initiate a strike. The au-
tonomy of a local union might be greater when national interventions in
company-level negotiations are few, no vetoes are passed on enterprise strikes.
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and the local union has independent control over finances or over the ap-
pointment of workplace representatives (Benson and Cospel 2008; Visser
2011). Under these circumstances, workplace branches will have greater au-
tonomy to launch a strike without being constrained by the regulations of
the national trade union. Therefore, I expect that the local union branches
of countries with decentralized unions will depend less on organizational
factors for the initiation of a strike.
Hypothesis 6: The company-level effects of union organization on
strike incidence are weaker in countries where the union move-
ment is more decentralized.
Data, Measures, and Methods
I use data from the European Company Survey, 2009 (Eurofound and TNS
Infratest 2010). The ECS^2009 is a large-scale representative survey of firms
in both the private and public sectors across all EU-27 countries and three
acceding and candidate countries (i.e., Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey).
Interviews with managers and employee representatives were conducted in
more than 27,000 companies with 10 or more employees. Approximately all
sectors of activity (NACE rev. 1.1) were included in the sample with the excep-
tion of the agricultural sector, private households, and extraterritorial orga-
nizations. Management interviews, with the most senior official responsible
for personnel in each firm, were conducted in all companies {N= 27,160).
Interviews with an employee representative, preferably the chairperson of
the most important employee representative body in the firm, were con-
ducted in approximately 25% of the companies (A'^ = 6,569).^ Because infor-
mation on strikes, union organization, and works councils must be obtained
from the interview with the employee representative, I am able to include
only firms with both types of interviews. The analyses include only compa-
nies from EU-27 countries without missing information on relevant vari-
ables. Ultimately, the sample contains 5,873 companies.
The ECS-2009 data are used to conduct a series of multilevel analyses that
combine information on EU companies with the characteristics of the coun-
tries from which they were established. Because the dependent variable,
strike incidence, is dichotomous, I estimate a logistic model. In doing so, I
employ a two-level hierarchical design in which companies (Level 1) are
nested within countries (Level 2). At the lowest level (A'^ = 5,873), I include
variables related to union organization at the workplace (i.e., union mem-
bership rate, multi-unionism, and union-dominated works councils). To ac-
count for differences between individual companies and their likelihood of
experiencing industrial action, I control for company size, the economic
sector of activity, status (i.e., independent, subsidiary site, or headquarters).
a more comprehensive discussion of the ECS-2009, constilt the Technical Report (Riedmann
2009).
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public ownership, and the level upon which the collective agreement in
each company, if any, was negotiated. At the highest level {N= 27) ,^  country-
specific variables related to the trade union system are included using infor-
mation for 2008 from the ICTWSS database (Visser 2011). I discuss the
measurement of my key variables in greater detail below. Descriptive statis-
tics are presented in Appendix A.
Dependent Variable
I measure strike incidence using reports on industrial action from the em-
ployee representative. Respondents were asked whether there have been
one or more instances of industrial action in their establishment over the
past 12 months, and if so, what form of action this took: 1) stoppage of work
or strike; 2) strike of one day or more; 3) refusal to work overtime; and 4)
other actions. Unfortunately, the first two response categories are not mutu-
ally exclusive and do not allow me to differentiate between work stoppages
and strikes. Therefore, I construct a binary variable (1/0) to distinguish
companies in which at least one strike or work stoppage occurred over the
past 12 months (collapsing Category 1 and 2) from companies with no or
other forms of industrial action (collapsing Categories 3 and 4 with all com-
panies withotit reported industrial action).*
Independent Variables
Union Membership Rate
Employee representatives estimated the proportion of employees in their
establishment who belonged to a trade union. When the employee repre-
sentative was not aware of this information, he or she was asked to make an
estimation, using fixed categories of "none," "less than 20%," "20% to less
than 40%," "40% to less than 60%," "60% to less than 80%," "80% to less
than 100%," or "All." When an estimate was reported as a category, I recode
this information into a proportion by taking the category midpoint (e.g.,
"20% to less than 40%" is recoded as 30%). I recode this variable so that it
ranges from 0.0 (no union members) to 10.0 (100% union members).
Number of Unions
I use the number of trade unions represented at the workplace as a proxy
for multi-unionism. The maximum number of unions is truncated at 11,
'There are varying rules of thumb regarding the minimum number of observations in multilevel
analysis. In general, these rules suggest that greater numbers at both levels increase the accuracy of the
estimates and standard errors. With respect to the country level, advice ranges from no minimum (Gel-
man and Hill 2007) to at least 50 (for a discussion see Hox 2010). The current research investigates
cotintries in the EU; therefore, 27 is the maximum number of country-level observations.
•'Alternative coding of the dependent variable, for example, contrasting any form of action with no
action at all, prodtices similar results to those presented in this article.
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and only 0.4% of the firms reported more than 11 unions. Note that this
measure disregards the potential dissimilarities in the bases for distinctions
among unions (e.g., occupational, political, or religious divisions). Multi-
unionism may only be related to interunion competition when two or more
unions represent the same type of workers. Unfortunately, the ECS data do
not permit the study of this feature of multi-unionism.
Union-Dominated Works Councils
I measure union membership among employee representatives in a manner
similar to the procedure that measures union membership rate among the
workforce. I use this information to construct a dummy variable that indi-
cates whether the majority (>50%) of the works councilors are union mem-
bers (1) or not (0).
Before including the union organization variables into the analyses, two
transformations are conducted. Eirst, I transform union membership rate
and the number of unions into their natural logarithm. By taking the loga-
rithm of both variables, I account for the fact that the effects of union mem-
bership rate and the number of unions on strike incidence might not be
linear. Preliminary analyses demonstrate that with the log transformations,
the models presented in this article yield a better model fit,^ suggesting that
there may be diminishing returns in the effects of union membership rate
and the number of unions on strikes. Second, all three variables are centered
at the country mean. Using group-mean centering is often recommended in
multilevel modeling when interaction effects are of substantive interest, es-
pecially when cross-level interactions are involved. Without centering, or
vdth grand-mean centering, cross-level interactions are sometimes con-
founded with between-group interactions (cf. Hofmann and Cavin 1998;
Enders and Tofighi 2007; Hox 2010). Because this recommendation stands
"regardless of whether the predictor is continuous or binary" (Enders and
Tofighi 2007: 135), I also centered the dummy-variable for union-dominated
works councils at its country-mean value.
Country-Level Variables
Union Density Rate
This variable from the ICTWSS database measures the net union member-
ship as a proportion of the wage and salary earners in employment (i.e., the
total number of union members [minus union members outside the active
labor force] *100, divided by the number of employed-wage and salary
5 T
=In multilevel modeling, Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC) is used as a general fit index (Hox
2010). The model with the lowest AIC value is usually the preferred model. The AIC statistic of the model
with the log transforms was 3391, whereas this value was 3404 for the model with a linear effect of union
membership rate and 3398 for the model with a linear effect of multi-unionism. The effect of multi-
unionism was not significant without the logarithmic transformation.
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workers in the OECD Labour Force Statistics). This variable ranges from 7.27
in Estonia to 68.27 in Sweden.
Number of Confederations
The number of union confederations in the ICTWSS database ranges from
1 to 7. Only central organizations are included (i.e., confederations with af-
filiate unions and memberships that exceed 5% of the total union member-
ship in that country). Smaller confederations are ignored and considered
part of the independent, autonomous, or unaffiliated union membership.
Union Decentralization
The ICTWSS database includes a summary measure of the power that
unions have over their local or workplace branches and representatives.
This measure is the sum of five items that are measured on a 3-point scale
(0-2): union power in local wage bargaining, appointment of workplace
representatives, finances of local branches, strike funds, and strike vetoes.
In Visser's original calculation, the maximum value referred to the situation
in which the union has "full" authority over local branches. I reverse this
variable to measure the degree of "union decentralization." In the countries
that I study, the metric ranges from 0 for "centralized union system" to 7 for
"decentralized union system." In the analyses, all three country-level vari-
ables are included as mean-centered covariates.
Results
Company-Level Effects
In Table 1,1 present the results of the multilevel logistic regression analysis
of strike incidence.^ Model 1 includes five sets of control variables at the
company level. First, I control for economic activity based on 1-digit NACE
categories with manufacturing and energy (NACE Categories C, D, and E) as
references. Compared with firms in these categories, I find that strikes are
less likely in most other industries. Only in education (NACE M) do I find
that the odds of experiencing a strike are approximately twice as high
(gO,699) Strikes are least common in the finance and intermediation indus-
try (NACEJ).
Second, I control for public sector firms. The positive effect (0.663) indi-
cates that strikes are almost twice as likely in public sector firms compared
with privately owned firms. To account for cross-national differences in
strike rights for the public sector, I allow a random slope for the effect of
^All models are estimated using the Ime4 package in R (Bates, Maechler, and Bolker 2011). To con-
struct Figure 1,1 adapted a piece of R code from Kastellec and Leoni (2007). Figure 2 was constructed
using a function by Baayen (2011 ).
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Table I. Results of the Multilevel Logistic Analysis
of Strike Incidence in EU Companies
Vañable
Fixed effects
Company-tevel variables
Economic activity» (NACE C D E = reference)
NACE F
NACE G
NACE H
NACE I
N A C E J • • , . .
N A C E K
/ j - .
N A C E L -• ..-i .
NACKM . ' Í .. .^ i- i
N A C E N ,. , • ,„,
NACE O
Public sector
Company size (10-19 employees = reference)
20-49
100-199 : • • - - ,
200-399 •
400-500 \ .. Í .-,
500+ . . -. • u ,
Company status (independent = reference)
Headquarters
Stibsidiary site ' • t • ,.'
Unknown
Collective agreement (company level = reference)
None
Higher level • . i • : . ' : i :
Mixed
Company-tevel union organization
(In) Union membership rate''
(in) Multi-unionism''
Union-dominated works council
Interactions
Union membership x Multi-unionism
Union membership x Works council
Works council x Multi-unionism
Random Effects
Variance at Country Level
Random Slope Ptiblic Sector
AIC
Model
b
-3.931***
-0.598**
-0.566**
-0.782*
-0.184
-0.924**
-0.730***
-0.113
0.699***
0.094
-0.565**
0.663***
0.368
0.332
0.688***
0.857***
1.070***
1.330***
0.261**
0.486***
0.212
-0.251
0.330***
-0.280
0.574***
0.361***
0.296***
1.96
0.56
.3391
/
(SE)
(0.37)
(0.30)
(0.23)
(0.46)
(0.24)
(0.42)
(0.26)
(0.20)
(0.20)
(0.18)
(0.28)
(0.23)
(0.22)
(0.23)
(0.23)
(0.23)
(0.27)
(0.23)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.27)
(0.19)
(0.12)
(0.20)
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.11)
(1.40)
(0.75)
Model 2
b
-3.843***
-0.624**
-0.571**
-0.748
-0.154
-0.920**
-0.760***
-0.161
0.644***
0.084
-0.543*
0.705***
0.363
0.316
0.667***
0.825***
1.047***
1.327***
0.256**
0.491***
0.217
-0.233
0.327***
-0.276
0.596***
0.386***
0.382***
-0.466**
-0.249
-0.220
1.92
0.58
3385
(SE)
(0.37)
(0.30)
(0.23)
(0.46)
(0.24)
(0.42)
(0.26)
(0.20)
(0.20)
(0.18)
(0.28)
(0.23)
(0.22)
(0.23)
(0.23)
(0.23)
(0.27)
(0.23)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.27)
(0.19)
(0.12)
(0.20)
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.21)
(0.19)
(0.27)
(1.38)
(0.76)
Notes: N.^,.,., = 5,873; N|„,^ .,., = 27.
»NACE: CDE = Manufacturing and energy: F = Construction: G = Wholesale and retail trade; re-
pair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods; H = Hotels and restau-
rants; I = Transport, storage and communication; J = Financial intermediation; K = Real estate,
renting and business activities; L = Public administration and defense; comptilsory social security;
M = Education; N = Health and social work; O = Other community, social and personal service
activities.
'' (In) = natural logarithmic transformation
* Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level (two-tailed test).
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public sector firms on strike incidence; thus, I let public sector firms have a
different effect on strikes across the range of countries in the study. A likeli-
hood ratio test revealed that the random slope model fit the data better
than a model with only a fixed coefficient for the public sector (LR y} = 19.3,
df = 2). Nevertheless, this random-effects model suggests that a positive
slope for public sector establishments is found in most countries.^
Third, I account for company size, which is measvxred using seven catego-
ries with the smallest category (10-19 employees) applied as the reference.
I find that strikes are more likely as the firm size increases. Relative to the
smallest category of firms, the odds of larger firms experiencing a strike are
nearly twice as high (e"''^ **) when there are 100 to 199 employees, and this
finding amounts to 2.3 times, 2.9 times, and 3.8 times for workplaces with
200 to 399, 400 to 500, and 500+ employees, respectively.
Fourth, I control for whether the companies are single and independent
organizations (the reference) or part of a larger organization (differentiat-
ing between headquarters and subsidiary sites). I also include a dummy in-
dicator for companies in which the manager did not provide clear status
information. I find that the odds of experiencing a strike are approximately
1.6 times higher in subsidiary sites compared with independent firms
(gO.486\
Fifth, I include a set of control variables to indicate whether, and at what
level, a collective wage agreement covers employees. The reference category
consists of firms in which the collective agreement is negotiated at the com-
pany level. I find a positive effect for the dummy variable, indicadng that
the collective agreement is negotiated at a higher level (0.330). This result
suggests that the odds of having a strike are 1.4 times higher when a collec-
tive agreement is in place at a higher level than the firm.
Union Organization Effects
Model 1 supports Hypotheses la-lc regarding the relationship between
union organization and strikes. All three union organization effects are pos-
itive and significant. The positive effects of union membership rate (0.574)
and multi-unionism (0.361) confirm Hypotheses la and lb. Strikes are
more likely to occur in companies where la) union membership is high and
lb) the number of unions is high. Moreover, I find a positive and significant
effect of union-dominated works councils (0.296). This effect implies that
companies in which trade union members make up more than 50% of the
local works council are 1.3 times (e°^ ^ )^ more likely to experience a strike
than companies without a union majority in the works council. Hence,
"In most countries, the country-specific slope does not deviate from the mean slope (0.663). The
public sector effect is stronger than average for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Portu-
gal, and the United Kingdom, whereas this effect is weaker than average in the Netherlands. The effect
in Finland is negative (-0.828), which indicates that Finnish public sector establishments are less likely to
strike than private sector companies.
UNION ORGANIZATION AND STRIKE INCIDENCE IN THE EU 73
Hypothesis lc is also confirmed: strikes are more likely in companies with
union-dominated works councils.
Company-Level Interaction Effects
To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c, I model interactions between the three
union organization variables. Hypothesis 2a states that strikes are more
likely in companies as union membership increases but that this effect is
weaker when many unions are at the workplace. For this hypothesis to be
supported, I must find a negative effect in the interaction between union
membership rate and multi-unionism. This finding is confirmed in Model 2
(Table 1). The main effect of membership rate (0.596) indicates that mem-
bership rate has a positive effect on strike incidence when the log number
of unions is at its country-mean value. However, the negative interaction ef-
fect (-0.466) indicates that membership rate has a weaker and eventually
negative effect on strikes when the log number of unions at the workplace is
greater than the country average. This finding suggests that higher mem-
bership is associated with more strikes only when interunion competition is
relatively low. In multi-union companies, the capacity to mobilize members
may diminish because the various unions have a different membership base
and articulate different interests.
Model 2 shows no support, however, with respect to the other interaction
hypotheses. In spite of Hypothesis 2b, the interaction between union mem-
bership rate and union-dominated works councils is not found to be signifi-
cant. Hence, the effect of membership rate on strike incidence is not weaker
in companies with a union-dominated works council. This contradicts the
expectation that domination over works councils would make a union less
dependent on general membership rates to mobilize employees and orga-
nize a strike. Also, no statistically significant interaction is found between
union-dominated works councils and the number of unions. Therefore, Hy-
pothesis 2c, stating that the positive relationship between works council
domination and strikes would be weaker when the number of unions is
higher, is not supported. Based on these findings, nothing upholds the as-
sumption that multi-unionism would undermine the organizational capac-
ity of union-dominated works councils.
Cross-National Differences
Country-Specific Effects of Union Organization
To examine whether the influence of the company-level effects of union
organization on strike incidence differs across countries, I extend Model 1
to include three random slopes, one for each union organization variable.
Thus, I allow union membership rate, multi-unionism, and union-dominated
works councils to have a different effect with regard to strikes in each coun-
try (henceforth, the union organization random effects model). These country-
specific effects (calculated as the mean slope H- deviation from mean slope ±
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Standard error; cf. Gelman and Hill 2007) are displayed in Eigure 1. The
dashed vertical line in each figure is the mean slope of this effect across all
the countries. The dot plots and error bars indicate the country-specific
slope coefficients and their standard error intervals, respectively. By visual-
izing the random effects in this manner, I can determine the extent to which
a country-specific effect difiers from the mean slope (caution is needed in in-
terpreting country-specific effects as relative to each other [Gelman and
Hill 2007: 271]). Eigure 1 indicates that Hypothesis 3, which states that dif-
ferences occur among countries with regard to the company-level effects of
union organization on strike incidence, is supported.
Eigure lA shows that the mean slope of union membership rate is 0.63,
and this effect is significant at the .01 level. Consistent with Table 1, this
finding indicates that an increase in membership rate is, on average, associ-
ated with higher likelihood of experiencing a strike. The error bars for the
majority of countries overlap with the mean slope, which suggests that the
extent to which membership rate is associated with strike incidence is ap-
proximately similar and positive for most countries. This effect is weaker for
four countries compared with the average. In particular, the results suggest
that launching a strike is less dependent on the company-level unionization
rate in Greece and Italy. In these countries, relatively few union members
are needed to start a strike. The effect of membership rate is stronger than
average for Germany and, on the borderline, for Austria. Here, initiating a
strike requires a relatively strong membership base.
Eigure IB shows that a large amount of variation occurs across countries
with regard to the associations between multi-unionism and strike inci-
dence. Consistent with Table 1, the mean slope of multi-unionism is positive
(0.42), which indicates that, on average, strikes are more likely in compa-
nies in which the number of unions is higher. Eigure IB shows that this
positive effect is particularly strong in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and
Belgium. In these countries, each additional union is more likely to be as-
sociated with the occurrence of a strike than in most other countries. Eor
the majority of the countries, however, I find no indication that the effect of
multi-unionism is substantially different from the average effect. Only in six
countries is the association between the number of unions at the workplace
and the likelihood of a strike clearly weaker, and potentially even negative.
A negative effect of multi-unionism (as in Denmark, Poland, and maybe the
United Kingdom) would suggest that strikes are less likely in companies in
which the number of unions is high.
I also find differences among countries with regard to the effect of union-
dominated works councils. The mean slope in Eigure lC is not significant,
which indicates that, on average, whether union members dominate the
employee representative body in a company does not matter. Eor many
countries, the error bars in Eigure lC overlap with the mean slope, and this
result suggests that union-dominated works councils do not affect strike in-
cidence in those countries. In the top six countries, however, I find a posi-
tive effect of union-dominated works councils, and this effect is the strongest
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Eigure 1. Random Effects of Union-Organization Variables
on Strike Incidence in EU Companies'"
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A. Country-specific effects of union membership rate on strike incidence
Belgium-
Spain-
Sweden-
Slovenia-
France-
Cyprus-
Germany -
Austria-
Slovakia-
Malta-
Greece-
Latvia-
Hungary-
Estonia-
Lithuania-
Italy-
Romania-
Bulgaria-
Finland-
Czech Republic-
Ireland-
Portugal-
United Kingdom-
Poland-
Denmark-
B. Country-specific effects of multi-unionism on
strike incidence
mean slope = -0.07
(p=0.66; not signifioant)
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C. Cotintry-specific effects of union-dominated
works councils on strike incidence
" The dashed vertical line in each figure represents the mean slope across all countries. The dot plots and
error bars indicate the country-specific slope coefficients and their standard error intervals, respectively.
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for companies in Greece and Germany (Figure lC). The country-specific
slope in these countries is approximately 1, which indicates that companies
with union-dominated works councils are approximately 2.7 times (e') more
likely to experience a strike than those without. In other countries, such as
Sweden, Austria, and Slovakia, I find that this effect may be reversed, which
suggests that union domination would be associated with fewer strikes.
Cross-Level Interaction Effects
Thus far, I have shown that the relationship between union organization and
strikes can be found at the level of individual companies. I have also demon-
strated that the magnitude and nature of this relationship differs across
countries. Next, I test the extent to which the characteristics of national trade
union systems influence the company-level effects of union organization.
Table 2 shows the cross-level interaction effects on strike incidence. These
Tcéle 2. Cross-Level Interaction Effects Based on a Multilevel
Logistic Analysis of Strike Incidence in EU companies'^ ''
Company-level
Union membership rate
Multi-unionism
Union-dominated works
council
Country-tevel
Union Density
Number of Confederations
Union Decentralization
Company-level
Union membership rate
Multi-unionism
Union-dominated works
council
Country-levet
Union Density
Number of Confederations
Union Decentralization
Cross-level Interactions
Mtilti-unionism
X Union Density
X Number of Confederations
X Union Decentralization
Model 3
0.564***
0.382**
-0.162
0.029**
0.284***
0.440***
Model 5
0.552***
0.519**
-0.136
0.028**
0.300***
0.428***
-0.030***
0.006
-0.296***
(0.12)
(0.22)
(0.19)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.12)
(0.20)
(0.19)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.01)
(0.08)
(0.11)
Company-level
Union membership rate
Multi-unionism
Union-dominated works
council
Country-tevel
Union Density
Number of Confederations
Union Decentralization
Cross-level Interactions
Union membership rate
X Union Density
X Number of Confederations
X Union Decentralization
Company-level
Union membership rate
Mtilti-unionism
Union-dominated works
coiuicil
Country-levet
Union Density
Number of Confederations
Union Decentralization
Cross-level Interactions
Union-dominated works council
X Union Density
X Number of Confederations
X Union Decentralization
Mode
0.759***
0.382*
-0.175
0.030**
0.284***
0.418***
-0.003
-0.056
-0.124**
14
(0.13)
(0.22)
(0.19)
(0.01)
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.01)
(0.05)
(0.05)
Model 6
0.549***
0.462**
-0.025
0.003
0.281**
0.141
-0.023**
-0.019
-0.262***
(0.11)
(0.22)
(0.18)
(0.02)
(0.14)
(0.15)
(0.01)
(0.08)
(0.09)
Notes: Controlled for economic activity, company size, company status, public sector and the level of col-
lective agreement (see Table 1).
* Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level (two-tailed test).
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models are built by extending the union organization random effects model; how-
ever, because of space limitations, I present only the interaction coefficients
between union organization at the individual firms and the country-level
union characteristics. First, in Model 3,1 simultaneously include the context
variables. The direct effects of union density (0.029), the number of confed-
erations (0.284), and union decentralization (0.440) suggest that compa-
nies are more likely to experience strikes in countries where union density
and the number of confederations are high, and where trade union move-
ment is decentralized. In the subsequent models (4, 5, and 6), I compute
the cross-level interaction effects. I plot the interactions that are significant
at the 0.10 level or better to ease interpretation (see Figure 2).
The cross-level interaction hypotheses state that the company-level effects
of union organization on strike incidence are weaker in countries with
higher levels of union density, with more confederations, and with a decen-
tralized union system. To support these hypotheses, negative interaction ef-
fects should appear between a company's union membership rate (Model
4), multi-unionism (Model 5), union-dominated works councils (Model 6),
and the country-level variables.
The results show that the firm-level association between union organiza-
tion and strikes is influenced by national context, especially a country's de-
gree of union decentralization seems to matter. In Model 4, a negative
interaction coefficient is found between a country's degree of union decen-
tralization and the company-level effect of union membership rate. Figure
2A clearly shows that the positive effect of membership rate on strike inci-
dence is weaker in countries with a decentralized labor movement and
stronger in countries with a more centralized labor movement. Model 5
shows significant negative interaction between a country's degree of union
decentralization and multi-unionism. As indicated in Figure 2B, this interac-
tion implies that the impact of multi-unionism on strikes is negative in de-
centralized union systems but positive in centralized systems. Figure 2C,
based on Model 6, shows a similar pattern for the interaction between a
country's degree of union decentralization and the union-member domina-
tion of the local employee representative body. The effect of union-
dominated councils on strikes is positive in countries in which union
decentralization is low, but this effect is negative when union decentraliza-
tion is high.®
Table 2 also demonstrates some support for the moderating effect of the
national levels of union density. As expected, the interactions between the
union organization variables at the company level and the union density rate
at the country level are negative and significant, except for company-level
*To eliminate the possibility that the country-specific effects of union-dominated works councils are
artifacts of the differences in the status and structure of disparate EU nations (Gumbrell-McCormick and
Hyman 2010), I calculated the interaction between the union domination over the local works council
and the type of system (dual vs. single channel systems). This interaction was not significant, nor was the
effect of the works council stronger in countries with greater legal mandates.
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union membership (Model 4). Model 5 clearly shows that the positive effect
of multi-unionism (0.519) on strike incidence is weaker when the union
density rate at the country level increases (-0.030). This finding might sup-
port the assumption that multi-unionism is positively associated with strike
incidence because competing unions use strikes to attract new members
(Dobson 1997). There might be less need for unions to attract new mem-
bers when national membership rates are high. At maximum union density,
the effect of multi-unionism is even negative, see Eigure 2D. Again, a similar
pattern is found for the interaction between country-level union density
and union domination over the local works council. Eigure 2E, based on
Model 6, shows that the effect of union-dominated councils on strikes is
positive in countries with low union density, but this effect is negative when
union density is high.
All in all. Table 2 provides strong support for Hypothesis 6 on the impact
of union decentralization and moderate support for Hypothesis 4 on the
role of national union density. Hypothesis 5, however, cannot be confirmed.
The number of union confederations in a country does not influence any of
the company-level union organization effects.
' Conclusion
In this article, I investigated the occurrence of strikes in EU companies.
Eirst, I determined the extent to which union organization was associated
with strike incidence at the level of individual firms. The analyses based on
large-scale, cross-national, and firm-level data demonstrate clear evidence
that local union organization affects the likelihood that a company will ex-
perience a strike. I have shown that the proportion of union members in
the workforce, the number of represented unions, and the majority of
union members who serve as employee representatives generally increase
the incidence of strikes in a company. My findings not only confirm that the
relationship between union organization and strikes exists at the company
level but also prove that the interplay between different types of organiza-
tion may lead to different outcomes in disparate companies. On the one
hand, I have shown that the organizational resources associated with high
membership density can be undermined by interunion competition. On
the other hand, however, no evidence supports that multi-unionism under-
mines the organizational capacity of union-dominated works councils. Nor
do I find that a strong position on the works council substitutes the organi-
zational resources of high levels of union membership. Yet, this research
shows that the effects of union organization on strike incidence depend on
the constellation of local union resources and constraints.
Next, I showed that the company-level effects of union organization on
strikes vary across countries. Previous studies have already suggested that
the extent to which organizational resources are associated with the ability
of unions to initiate a strike differs across countries. Previous studies, how-
ever, did not conduct large-scale comparisons. By analyzing more than 5,000
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firms across all EU member states, I have demonstrated, for example, that
the effect of the membership rate on strike incidence is smaller in France,
Creece, and Italy compared with many other countries. This finding pro-
vides a broader international perspective for Coutrot's (1998) observation
that the ability of unions to initiate a strike in France is less dependent on
membership levels than in Britain. Moreover, my results support the argu-
ment that union competition has different effects on strike incidence across
different contexts. I found substantial cross-national differences in the
strength and nature of the multi-unionism/strike relationship. This rela-
tionship was sometimes positive, sometimes negative, and sometimes non-
existent. At the company-level, however, I had no information on how
various unions are organized; the ECS-2009 data provide information only
on the number of unions at the workplace, and not whether disparate
unions have a distinct occupational, political, or religious basis. For future
research, this again raises the question about the mechanisms by which
multi-unionism is associated with strike activity, and whether different expla-
nations apply in different contexts (Akkerman 2008).
Finally, I determined the extent to which a country's trade union system
influences the company-level effects of union organization on strike inci-
dence. My findings confirm that micro-level labor relationships and their
outcomes should be studied within their macro-level contexts. I showed that
the level of union density in a country, the number of union confederations
and the degree of union decentralization direcfly affect the likelihood of
industrial action in individual companies. This implies that after accounting
for company-specific characteristics of union organization and other firm-level
variables, a company is more likely to experience a strike when it is estab-
lished in a country with high membership rates, more confederations, and a
decentralized union movement.
Through cross-level interactions I was able to show that a country's de-
gree of union decentralization influences the firm-level association between
union organization and strikes. Generally, I found that the company-level
effects of union organization on strikes are weaker in countries where the
union movement is more decentralized. In decentralized systems, work-
place branches have greater autonomy to launch a strike and will therefore
be less reliant on organizational resources and constraints. The same might
apply to countries with high union density. Firm-level resources like works-
council domination, or constraints like interunion competition, are less
strongly associated with strikes when national membership rates are high.
Interestingly, a strong union at the local employee representative body may
even mitigate potential conflict in case of high national membership levels,
and in case the labor movement is highly decentralized. What is also clear
from the analysis is that the number of union confederations in a country
did not interact with any of the company-level union organization variables.
Although strikes are more likely in countries with multiple confederations,
the number of confederations did not moderate the effects of firm-level
union organization on strikes.
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Using a multilevel analysis of international, firm-level data, I demon-
strated that the magnitude and nattire of the relationship between union
organizations and workplace strikes depends on the labor movement con-
text within a country. A few reservations apply with regard to this article.
Although organizational resources help to explain the capacity for strike mo-
bilization, a focus on resources provides little information on the sources of
labor conflict. Resource mobilization theory may be criticized for disregard-
ing the relationship between variation in workplace grievances and strike
incidence, implicitly assuming a "constancy of discontent" (cf. McAdam,
McCarthy, and Zald 1988: 697). To even better understand the conditions
under which resources matter, future research may expand the models pre-
sented here by acknowledging the variation in workplace grievances. Next,
the large-scale analyses presented here come at the cost of detail with re-
gard to the country-specific features of bargaining systems or economic con-
ditions. Subsequent studies might more thoroughly address the differences
in union or federation structures across nations. Next, other country-level
characteristics might affect labor relationships and collective action at the
level of individual firms. For example. Brandi and Traxler (2010) summa-
rized an extensive list of potential economic and institutional factors that
shape the opportunity and constraints for industrial conflict. Moreover,
contexts can change. This study, which used data for 2009, is a snapshot of
European companies during an economic crisis. Longitudinal data wotild
be required to determine whether time-varying conditions influence the re-
sults presented here. I leave it to future research to address these issues. In
doing so, the methodological approach taken in this article, despite its limi-
tations, is promising.
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Appendix A
Table A.I. Descriptive Statistics of the Company-Level Variables
Variables
Strike incidence
Union membership
Multi-unionism
Union-dominated works cotmcil
Economic activity
C-D-E
NACE F
NACE G
NACE H
NACE I
NACEJ
NACEK
NACEL
NACE M
NACEN
NACE O
Company size
10-19 employees
20-49 employees
50-99 employees
100-199 employees
200-399 employees
400-500 employees
500+ employees
Public sector
Company status
Independent
Subsidiary site
Headquarters
Unknown
Level of collective agreement
No collective agreement
Company level
Higher level
Mixed
Mean
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.32
0.06
0.10
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.07
0.12
0.10
0.11
0.05
0.11
0.20
0.19
0.14
0.16
0.05
0.15
0.37
0.62
0.18
0.18
0.01
0.14
0.32
0.45
0.08
Standard
deviation
0.33
0.63
0.45
0.43
0.47
0.24
0.29
0.13
0.20
0.15
0.25
0.32
0.30
0.31
0.22
0.31
0.40
0.39
0.34
0.37
0.22
0.36
0.48
0.49
0.39
0.39
0.09
0.34
0.47
0.50
0.27
Minimum
0.00
-2.21
-1.38
-0.96
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Maximum
1.00
1.70
1.78
0.76
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Source: ECS-2009.
Note: N= 5,873.
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Table A. 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Country-Level Variables
Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Erance
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia . ,
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland -
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Union density
29.08
51.87
20.09
54.30
17.42
67.61
7.27
67.52
7.63
19.12
23.97
16.81
35.20
33.43
14.80
8.47
37.33
51.22
19.04
15.60
20.49
32.83
17.17
29.66
15.01
68.77
27.63
Number of confederations
1.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
2.00
3.00
7.00
3.00
2.00
6.00
LOO
7.00
LOO
3.00
' 4.00
3.00
3.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
2.00
7.00
6.00
3.00
1.00
Union decentralization
1.00
3.00
4.00
4.00
5.00
2.00
5.00
2.00
5.00
0.00
5.00
4.50
5.00
3.00
6.00
6.00
2.00
7.00
0.00
5.00
4.00
4.00
5.00
4.00
4.00
0.00
5.00
Source.-Visser (2011).
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